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SUMMARY My purpose is to examine some concepts of mathematical 
logic studied by Carlo Cellucci. Today the aim of classical mathematical 
logic is not to guarantee the certainty of mathematics, but I will argue that 
logic can help us to explain mathematical activity; the point is to discuss 
what and in which sense logic can "explain". For example, let us consider 
the basic concept of an axiomatic system: an axiomatic system can be very 
useful to organize, present, and clarify mathematical knowledge. And, 
more importantly, logic is a science with its own results: so, axiomatic 
systems are also interesting because we know several revealing theorems 
about them. Similarly, I will discuss other topics such as mathematical 
definitions, and some relationships between mathematical logic and 
computer science. I will also consider these subjects from an educational 
point of view: can logical concepts be useful in teaching and learning 
elementary mathematics? 
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1. Mathematical logic vs. the foundations of mathematics 
 
There is no doubt that research in mathematical logic can contribute to the 
study of the foundations of mathematics. For instance, mathematical logic 
provides answers (both complete and partial) to the following questions: 
- Given a precisely stated conjecture, can we be sure that eventually 
a good enough mathematician will be able to prove or disprove it? 
- Can all mathematics be formalized? 
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- Is there a "right" set of axioms for arithmetic, or for mathematical 
analysis? is there a proof (in some fixed theory) for any statement of 
arithmetic which is true in N? 
- Can we prove the consistency of standard mathematical theories? 
and what does it mean to prove consistency? 
- By adding a new axiom to a theory, we find new theorems; but can 
we also expect to find shorter proofs for old theorems? 
- Will we ever construct a computer that will be capable of 
answering all mathematical problems? 
- Is any function from N to N computable by an appropriate 
computer? if not, how can we describe computable functions? 
- If we know that a computation ends, can we estimate the time 
necessary to complete the computation? 
- Is it true that, if a "short" statement is a theorem, then there is a 
short proof for it? 
The list could be much longer. In some cases (as in the first question) 
the answer given by logic contradicts the expectations of a working 
mathematician, while in other cases (as in the last question) the answer 
confirms that expectation. 
However, it is not true that the general purpose of mathematical logic 
is to clarify the foundations of mathematics. First of all, for the past few 
decades, much research in logic has been of mainly technical value and 
does not deal directly with the foundation of mathematics. Perhaps in the 
nineteenth century, logic was regarded as a way to guarantee the certainty 
of mathematics. But nowadays we do not expect that much: it seems 
naïve, and perhaps even futile, to hope for a definitive, proven certainty of 
mathematics. 
Let us start from the beginning. Mathematical logic provides us with a 
precise definition of a proof and suggests rigorous methods and procedures 
for developing mathematical theories. But these are just the initial steps of 
mathematical logic: if logic consisted only in giving detailed definitions of 
proofs and theories, it would not be of great scientific importance. While 
succeeding in formalizing statements and arguments is interesting, the 
historical and cultural importance of proof theory, model theory, and 
recursion theory strongly depends on the results achieved in these areas 
(for example, on the answers given to the previous questions). 
In other words, mathematical logic is a way of organizing mathematics 
and solving paradoxes; but I find that logic is interesting also because its 
organization of mathematics provides significant results. In fact, any 
theory grows if and when results are found. 
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So, we can distinguish between two kinds of logical results which can be 
useful in the study of foundations and, more generally, to working 
mathematicians. 
On the one hand, mathematical logic provides explicit rules that 
mathematicians habitually use (often without being fully aware of it), 
inserting them into a clear and consistent framework; in this way more 
complex situations can be tackled. For instance in logic: 
 
- it is explained what a proof by contradiction, or a counterexample, 
is; it is not impossible for a mathematician, who in his work usually gives 
proofs by contradiction and counterexamples, to be unable to give clear 
answers to explain these totally elementary concepts1; 
- various forms of the principle of induction are stated explicitly and 
compared; 
- equivalents to the axiom of choice, or weaker forms of it, are stated 
and recognized. 
 
On the other hand, mathematical logic allows us to construct a theoretical 
framework that clarifies the meaning and limitations of mathematical 
activity. The study of logic can provide information of the following kind: 
this theory is decidable, while this other one is not. Note that often logical 
results contrast with the naïve expectations of working mathematicians. 
 
2. Mathematical experience vs. mathematical logic 
 
In the introduction to the book The Mathematical Experience (Davis and 
Hersh 1981), Gian-Carlo Rota, challenging the idea that mathematics 
consists mainly of the demonstration of theorems, wrote a famous 
sentence: “A mathematician's work is mostly a tangle of guesswork, 
analogy, wishful thinking and frustration, and proof, far from being the 
                                                          
1 Let us briefly recall that the word counterexample denotes an example that shows 
that a statement is not correct, when the statement consists of an implication that is 
preceded by a universal quantifier. To this end, we have to construct an object x 
that satisfies the hypothesis but not the thesis. In formal terms, the explanation is 
clearer: to conclude that x [P(x)  Q(x)] does not hold, we have to prove¬ x 
[P(x)  Q(x)], that is, x ¬ [P(x)  Q(x)] and this formula is equivalent to x [P(x) 
¬ Q(x)]. 
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core of discovery, is more often than not a way of making sure our minds 
are not playing tricks.” 
Of course Gian-Carlo Rota was right2. It is true that in mathematical 
experience, when checking a method, testing a tool, or hoping that an 
application will follow, there are very often trials and failures. But in a 
logic book we will not find a chapter about hope or failure: it is not the 
purpose of mathematical logic to describe how a mathematician works. 
Regarding mathematical activity and its formalization, it is worth 
quoting three amusing conversations. In Davis and Hersh (1981) a 
philosophy grad student asks the Ideal Mathematician, “What is a 
mathematical proof, really?”. A similar question is considered in Devlin 
(1992); while in Hersh (2011) a Successful Mathematician is accosted by 
the Stubborn Student, who has trouble when comparing the mathematical 
concept of a limit with its concrete applications. 
But there is a different question: what is the meaning of logical notions 
such as mathematical proof and mathematical theories? Of course, these 
notions have to do with the work of a mathematician. 
First of all, a distinction must be made between the way in which a 
mathematician works and the final presentation of a subject. Logic refers 
to the organization of a mathematical subject in a clear form, so that other 
people can understand it: the starting point (axioms), new concepts 
(definitions), properties and consequences (theorems). 
In any case, mathematical logic simply supplies a suitable frame for 
mathematical theories, but we could also find other models. Is the logical 
model a convenient one? When discussing this point, we have to face two 
different questions: 
 
- is the model faithful? 
- is the model useful? 
 
Let me give a rough example: in our framework, taking a photograph 
could provide a faithful description, but would be totally useless. A 
faithful description which does not yield results is much less interesting 
                                                          
2  However, I do not agree with the idea that a proof is just a method of 
confirming what we already know. Note that many mathematicians (including 
Gian-Carlo Rota) have sought elegant proofs; moreover, very often a proof allows 
for a deeper understanding of the subject. 
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than an unfaithful description which yields results. There is no doubt that 
the logical formalization of the concept of a proof is far from a concrete 
proof and even further from the way in which a proof is found, but many 
results can be found in proof theory, which concern mathematicians, their 
expectations, and the limits of mathematics. From this point of view, logic 
is a fruitful model.We could make similar remarks about other areas of 
mathematics. Consider mathematical analysis: it rests on the set of real 
numbers, which can hardly be regarded as a faithful model of reality. But 
mathematical analysis has enormous importance, because its theorems can 
be fruitfully applied in physics and the natural sciences, in the study of the 
real world. 
Mathematical logic, exactly like mathematical analysis, is justified by 
its results. 
 
3. Axiomatic systems 
 
The axiomatic method is a way of thinking. This is true in mathematical 
research, as well as in mathematical education (I will deal with 
mathematical education in § 5 and 6). The concept of a mathematical 
axiom, and its meaning, is part of our culture; several sciences other than 
mathematics have tried to introduce something similar to axioms, in order 
to achieve a more convincing approach to the matter studied. 
In mathematics, the axiomatic method has had enormous influence 
from the time of Euclid (consider the fifth postulate and non-Euclidean 
geometries). Or, to give a present-day example, consider reverse 
mathematics which would not have been born without the concept of an 
axiomatic system; see (Marcone 2009) for a general introduction. 
Instead of discussing the relationship between axioms and theorems in 
general terms, I prefer to stress one particular aspect. 
Using the terminology of recursion theory (see Rogers 1967 for 
definitions), the set of axioms of a typical mathematical theory is recursive 
(or decidable), in the sense that one can recognize if a given sentence is an 
axiom. On the other hand, the set of theorems is not recursive, it is only 
recursively enumerable, because, given a sentence, we are generally not 
able to decide whether it is a theorem or not, we can only try and hope to 
get an answer. 
Mathematics allows us to jump from a recursive set up to a set which is 
recursively enumerable but not recursive. So, even if the content of any 
given theorem is implicit in the axioms, the set of theorems is more 
complex, in a technical sense, than the set of axioms. 
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In my opinion, and from an abstract point of view, this is the ultimate 
task of mathematics and, on the other hand, it explains the difficulty of 
doing mathematics. Some remarks are necessary. 
First of all, very often in the work of a mathematician, the set of 
axioms is not explicitly stated; but, even if this is the case, I think it can be 
assumed to be recursive, in the sense that the mathematician is able to 
recognize the axioms he is entitled to use. Moreover, a mathematician 
sometimes changes his hypothesis when trying to give a proof: he hoped 
that a result  held in general in a given theory T, but realized that it is 
necessary to add a hypothesis . The axiomatic approach is not affected in 
this case, because it has been proven that  is a theorem of T. 
It should be observed that the mathematical community searches 
continuously for new axioms, which are deeper or more general, or more 
suitable for some purpose, trying to give a more comprehensive 
explanation of a subject. 
Taking account of these situations, Carlo Cellucci (2002) introduced 
and studied “open systems”, which can better describe the analytical 
method adopted by mathematicians. A fairly similar approach was 
suggested in strictly logical terms by Roberto Magari (1974) and (1975). 
These ideas are profound and relevant, but I think that open systems are 
not to be juxtaposed on axiomatic systems, because both reflect 
mathematical activities. Note also that a new axiom, or a new hypothesis, 
can be considered in different situations: as a partial step in the solution of 
a problem, or because it allows us to find desired consequences, or when 
introducing a new axiomatic system. 
Let us go back to the set of theorems. A working mathematician may 
be astonished by the fact that this set is recursively enumerable, since, at 
first glance, it seems to be even more complex. The point is that a 
mathematician does not proceed by listing the set of theorems and looking 
for something interesting: his procedure is completely different. However, 
the fact that the set of theorems is recursively enumerable corresponds to 
the possibility of checking any proof. 
 
4. Some remarks about definitions 
 
a) A definition is just an abbreviation, since a long expression is 
substituted by a single new term: it is introduced simply for the reader's 
convenience. We could always replace the defined term with the defining 
expression: we get a statement that is less clear than the original one, but 
that has the same content. 
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b) Definitions are an indispensable part of any book on mathematics. 
Definitions not only draw attention to what will be useful later, but 
correspond to concepts, and therefore must be fully understood by 
anybody who studies a subject. For instance, the definitions of limit, 
continuity, derivative, are essential for studying calculus. 
In my opinion, claims a) and b) are both correct. Claim a) reflects a 
theoretical and abstract point of view, whereas b) applies to every human 
being who learns mathematics. 
There is no contradiction between a) and b), just as there is no 
contradiction between someone who says that a sphere is a locus of points 
which have the same distance from a given point, and someone who thinks 
of a sphere as something round, that can roll perfectly in all directions. 
A typical question about definitions is the following: is a theorem 
proved starting only from axioms or starting from both axioms and 
definitions? 
First note that, in mathematics, a definition gives no information about 
the objects involved: in elementary geometry we can define the bisector of 
an angle before knowing that any angle has a bisector. From this point of 
view, a definition cannot be a starting point for proving something (even 
though, of course, it can allow us to give other definitions). 
On the other hand, in many cases it seems that, during a proof, we rely 
on definitions, especially when basic concepts are involved. But let us 
compare the situation to an algebraic one. When making a complicated 
algebraic computation, it often happens that is convenient to introduce a 
new letter, for instance setting y = x2 (where the letter y did not occur 
previously). In doing this, we may be putting ourselves in a position to 
directly apply a known formula or to recognize an algebraic pattern; but 
note that the previous equivalence gives no information about x. The 
equivalence y = x2 is nothing but a definition, introduced only to make 
what follows accessible and clear. 
Returning to theorems and definitions, we conclude that any proof is 
supported by axioms (and already known theorems), and not by any 
definitions. When proving a theorem we often read statements such as: 
‘recalling the definition of a limit, we can say that ...’; or, ‘d is a divisor of 
p, but p is prime and, by the definition of a prime number, we conclude d = 
1 or d = p’. However, in these cases, the reference to a definition is useful 
only for recalling the meaning of a term, that is, for substituting a term 
with the proprieties used in defining that term. 
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5. Is mathematical logic useful at school? which concepts 
should be taught? 
 
Knowing mathematical logic does not provide a method for those who 
want to do research in geometry or analysis; in the same way, the study of 
logic does not provide a necessary introduction to high school 
mathematics. In fact, were some logical concepts to be summarized in the 
first chapter of a mathematical textbook, this chapter would very likely be 
nearly useless to students, and would soon be forgotten. 
What can be useful in high school are frequent discussions of the 
logical aspects of the mathematical concepts and procedures the students 
are dealing with. Indeed, mathematical education has an educational value 
that does not depend on applications. I am referring to skills involving the 
use of language and argumentation; and language and argumentation are 
obviously related to logic. 
Let us examine some points. 
 
a. Axiomatic systems 
An axiomatic system is a way both of correctly organizing and presenting 
knowledge in a mathematical area, and also in general of teaching a 
correct way of proving and deducing. 
In fact, without the concept of an axiomatic system, the teaching of 
mathematics consists only of an unjustified set of rules and arguments, 
based on common sense, or on the authority of the teacher. Such teaching 
is appropriate to middle school, but is not always suitable for high school. 
It has been remarked that, in the Elements of Euclid, the connections 
between axioms and theorems are complex: if we try to specify, for any 
theorem, the previous theorems and axioms upon which it depends, we 
find an intricate structure. Even a good student cannot completely master 
this logical structure. 
This may be true, but I believe it is not a good reason to give up! On 
the contrary, the teacher will pay attention to the ties between axioms and 
theorems in some specific cases, stress the fact that a theorem depends or 
does not depend e.g. on the Pythagorean theorem, and so on, even if he 
knows in advance that no student will learn the entire structure of the 
axiomatic system of Euclidean geometry. 
Equally, a comparison between Euclidean geometry and non-Euclidean 
geometries can be useful. The teacher will show that, in the new 
geometries, some known theorems remain valid, while others (such as the 
Pythagorean theorem, the sum of angles of a triangle, etc.) no longer hold; 
on the other hand, there are also new theorems (such as the fourth criterion 
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for triangles: if the angles of a triangle are congruent to the angles of a 
second triangle, the two triangle are congruent to each other). We must not 
underestimate the educational importance of the fact that a mathematical 
result holds in one theory but does not hold in another. 
 
b. Proving 
The difference between verifying and proving is obviously fundamental 
when teaching and learning mathematics (incidentally, it has been noted 
by several people that the use of computers in geometry and arithmetic 
does not help in this regard: why do we need to prove what is said or 
shown by a computer?). 
Of course, I am not referring to formal proofs. But even a student at the 
beginning of their high school education can understand some basic 
logical facts about proofs, such as: 
 
- any proof consists of several elementary steps; 
- it is not easy to find a proof, but a given proof can be checked by 
everybody who knows the concepts involved; 
- in many cases there are different proofs for the same statement; 
- some theorems are proved by contradiction; 
- if a theorem is an implication, the inverse implication is not always a 
theorem; 
- proving  is logically equivalent to proving ; 
- ‘not for every x ...’ is different from ‘for every x not ...’. 
 
The importance of proving in teaching and learning mathematics has been 
widely investigated; see for instance (Arzarello 2012), (Bernardi 1998), 
(Bernardi 2010), (Francini 2010). 
 
c. Formalizing statements 
For students at the end of high school or the beginning of university, 
formalizing statements is a useful exercise, and in particular finding the 
explicit quantifiers and implications hidden in natural language. Think of a 
trivial sentence like ‘the square of an odd number is odd’; in formalizing 
it, we have to write a universal quantifier as well as an implication: for any 
number n, if n is odd then n2 is odd. 
On the other hand, I think that translating mathematical statements into 
a first-order language is in general too difficult for students. Formalization 
can only be done in specific cases. I refer for instance to the definition of 
the limit of a function; in my opinion the difficulty in understanding this 
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notion also depends on the logical structure   x (this is one of the 
first times a student meets three alternating quantifiers). 
Many current words and expressions used in mathematics are perhaps 
useful in practice (and in particular in the practice of teaching), but are 
subject to criticism for being unclear or ambiguous: e.g., "given a 
number", "take a function", "we impose that ...", "the general term of a 
sequence", "fix the value x0 of a variable x", ... Formal language allows us 
to clarify these situations. In this respect, logic can contribute (and in fact 
has contributed) to improving rigour in natural mathematical language. For 
other remarks, see (Bernardi 2012). 
 
6. Formal notation and self-confidence at school, in 
algebra, geometry, logic 
 
Algebraic manipulation increases self-confidence in high school students. 
Of course, not all students acquire good skills in algebra; but the 
doubtful student seeks comfort in algebraic calculus and, in any case, tries 
to perform some algebraic computations. Algebraic language is effective, 
rules in algebra are clear and simple. Steps in computation do not require 
too much thought; for this very reason, students usually prefer algebra to 
geometry. 
Students, as well as teachers, rely on algebraic formalism: this is 
because algebraic formalism is artificial, and therefore governed by simple 
rules. Sometimes the abstract is more natural than the concrete: algebraic 
language is abstract, in the sense that it has been built by us and for us. 
From an educational point of view, there is the obvious risk of a 
mechanical and unconscious application of rules. On the other hand, 
regular practice with algebraic computation develops other skills, such as 
the capacity to make indirect controls: e.g., in some situations we will 
automatically be expecting a polynomial to be homogeneous (and 
therefore realize something is wrong if it turns out not to be). 
The situation is completely different in the teaching and learning of 
geometry. In my opinion, the teaching difficulties of Euclidean geometry 
also result from the lack of convenient notation. Take for example the 
angles RSP and SPQ of the quadrilateral PQRS: while these symbols 
are not long, they have to be continuously interpreted within a diagram. 
There is no formal manipulation, with the exception of very particular 
cases (for instance, referring to the sum of vectors the equivalence AB + 
BC = AC holds, but a similar equality does not hold for segments). 
Unlike algebraic expressions, geometrical symbols are not suitable for 
computation, they have only schematic and mnemonic value. 
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So, in the teaching of mathematics, even though the logical structure 
(axioms, theorems, primitive concepts, ...) is more evident in geometry 
than in algebra, a formal calculus occurs only in algebra. 
When introduced to the symbolic use of connectives and quantifiers at 
the end of high school or at the beginning of university, students are 
amazed by the expressive power of logical language: any mathematical 
statement seems to be expressible in symbolic logic. 
However, at that level a calculus in logic can be presented very rarely, 
and only in some specific cases. Symbols like connectives and quantifiers 
allow us to express sentences in a clear and concise way, but they must be 
interpreted each time, and cannot be directly manipulated. This situation 
presents analogies with notation in geometry, rather than with algebraic 
symbols. 
In high school we can have a "logical calculus" only in the 
construction of truth tables, but I think that this construction has limited 
value in mathematical education. From this point of view, logical language 
cannot provide a student with the same self-confidence as algebraic 
manipulation. 
 
7. Mathematical logic and computer science 
 
As is well known, computers can contribute to providing mathematical 
proofs. Does mathematical logic play a role in this contribution? 
To answer this question, I think that a distinction has to be made: there are 
(at least) three different kinds of contributions made by computer science 
to mathematics. 
- First of all, there are computer-assisted proofs. This name usually 
refers to a computer used to perform very long and complex computations, 
or to examine a great number of possibilities. The first famous case 
occurred in 1976, when the four colour theorem was proven. That proof 
has been discussed for a long time (perhaps too long); I believe that the 
point of discussion was not the certainty of the proof, but the change in the 
style of proving (like an athletic world record which is achieved by 
modifying technical equipment). A computer can also be used to find 
approximate solutions of equations, to simulate the evolution of a 
phenomenon, to visualize patterns. But these applications are not too 
different from the previous one. In all these cases, the role of logic is 
usually limited. 
- The role of logic is greater when a computer is used directly to find 
new theorems, or new proofs of known theorems, as happens particularly 
in algebra and geometry. This area is related to artificial intelligence: a 
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computer searches for new facts by combining known facts. The 
possibility that a computer may find and prove a theorem is fascinating. 
In these cases, to plan a theorem prover, formalization of arguments 
and proofs is obviously necessary. A problem is to direct the research 
towards statements of some interest. It is very easy to give rules to obtain 
new theorems: for instance, starting from A we can deduce A  A and B  
A, but how can we recognize interesting theorems among trivial ones? 
- Lastly, we must mention a more recent application, where the role 
of formal logic is even greater. 
Often, in the history of mathematics, a mistake has been found in a 
proof that had previously been accepted (the history of the proof of 
Jordan's theorem about simple closed curves in the plane is a typical 
example). In this third application of computer science, known as 
automated proof checking (or also, with a slightly different meaning, 
automated theorem proving), computers are used simply to formalize 
known proofs of theorems and check them in detail. The purpose is to 
certify theorems and collect them in libraries. We could mention, for 
instance, the Mizar system (see http://www.mizar.org/) and the Coq Proof 
Assistant (see http://coq.inria.fr). 
It is currently hard to predict just how much and how widely these 
supports will be used, but the interesting point is that automated proof 
checking not only guarantees greater accuracy (even if, in any case, we 
cannot hope for the complete certainty of a statement): in fact, looking for 
a better way to formalize also sheds new light, suggests new ideas, and 
brings in new generalizations. 
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